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Thank you for that kind introduction.* It is always a pleasure for me to 
return to Notre Dame Law School, an institution that is very dear to me.  As the 
father of two children who earned their law degrees from this school, and as the 
recipient of an honorary doctorate degree a few years ago, I regard Notre Dame 
Law School as an academic home away from home for me and my family.  I am 
especially pleased to be addressing the Federalist Society, an organization that 
plays a vital role on this and other campuses across the nation in fostering 
respectful, reasoned debate about a range of legal topics.   
Today, I would like to talk to you about Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, a case the Supreme Court handed down last term.1  The Court 
in Schuette had to determine whether a voter-approved amendment to the 
constitution of the State of Michigan, which eliminated racial preferences in 
college admissions, was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The case gained significant media attention because of its 
implications for affirmative action programs, but it was perhaps more important 
because of its strong vindication of the right of the states to decide questions where 
                                                          
* The views expressed herein are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the view 
of my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals.  I wish to acknowledge, 
with thanks, the assistance of Jason Barnes, my legal extern, in preparing these 
remarks. 
1
 Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
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the federal Constitution is silent.  And while these two issues garnered the 
headlines, Schuette is important for a third reason as well: the decision exemplifies 
the importance of language to the judicial process.  As we will see, the case 
involves the Justices parsing the text of the Constitution, engaging the prose of 
existing judicial precedent, and carefully crafting their own writing in an effort to 
shape the future of equal protection jurisprudence.  Such an emphasis on language 
is part and parcel of the judicial role and of the practice of law generally.      
Schuette originated in your neighbor state of Michigan, which has been the 
source of many recent affirmative action cases,2 but Michigan is not the only state 
to have played an important role in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence.  
California, located within the jurisdiction of my court, has also been at the 
forefront.  Ten years before Michigan voters went to the polls, California voters 
amended their state constitution to prohibit racial preferences in university 
admissions by passing Proposition 209, which gave rise to a case called Coalition 
for Economic Equity v. Wilson (commonly referred to as the Prop. 209 case).3  As 
it happens, I wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel in that case upholding the 
                                                          
2
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (dealing with race-based admission 
policies at the University of Michigan); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003), (dealing with race based policies at the University of Michigan Law 
School). 
3
 Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 718 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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right of the people of California to enact Proposition 209.  Accordingly, I will 
begin my discussion of the constitutional question in Schuette—“whether, and in 
what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial 
and other preferences in governmental decisions?”4—with my own experience in 
the Prop. 209 case in California.  
      I 
On November 5, 1996, California voters approved Proposition 209 by a 
margin of 54 to 46 percent, with nearly 9 million Californians casting ballots.5  In 
passing Prop. 209, California voters amended their state constitution to read: 
“[T]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in 
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”6  The 
day after the election, several groups filed a complaint in federal district court 
alleging that Prop. 209 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The trial judge agreed with the plaintiffs and issued an injunction.7  
                                                          
4
 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630. 
5
 4,736,180 people voted in favor of the initiative, and 3,986,196 voted against it. 
Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 718. 
6
 Cal. Const. art. 1§ 31(a). 
7
 The reasoning was twofold: First, Proposition 209 “elimination of ‘permissible 
race- and gender conscious affirmative action programs would reduce 
opportunities...for women and minorities.” Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 
5 
 
California appealed that decision, and the case arrived at the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
      II 
Before I move to the merits of the equal protection claims presented in the 
Prop. 209 case and Schuette, I should give a brief overview of the relevant 
doctrines implicated by these cases.  
      A 
We begin, as always, with the text.  The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment reads: “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.8  Of course, the requirement of 
“equal protection” does not mean the state may never draw distinctions among 
classes of people.  In fact, most classifications only need a rational basis to be 
compatible with the Constitution.   
However, there are a few classifications that demand heightened scrutiny. 
For instance, the Supreme Court has said, “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any 
sort are inherently suspect.”9  Therefore, any classification based on race must pass 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1997).  Second, Proposition 209 “has a racial and gender 
focus, which imposes a substantial political burden on the interests of women and 
minorities.”  Id.   
8
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1-Equal Protect. 
9
 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
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the most exacting judicial scrutiny: it must serve a compelling governmental 
interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 
 In a line of affirmative action cases,10 the Supreme Court has held that the 
Equal Protection Clause permits narrowly tailored race-based preferences that 
serve the compelling state interest of educational diversity.  However, as the Court 
has made clear, the ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause is “to do away 
with all governmentally imposed discrimination on the basis of race.”11  
You may find yourself wondering how the California and Michigan 
constitutional amendments, prohibiting race-based or sex-based preferential 
treatment, could ever be deemed to violate equal protection.  In fact, these 
amendments simply codify into their respective state constitutions the very purpose 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  “As a matter of ‘conventional’ equal protection 
analysis,” you would be correct: “[T]here is simply no doubt that [these 
amendments] are constitutional.”12  
 
      B 
                                                          
10
 See, e.g., id. (Powell, J., concurring); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Fisher v. University 
of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013). 
11
 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
12
 Coal. for Econ. Equity, 110 F.3d at 1439. 
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But there is a second strand of equal protection analysis, called the “political 
process” doctrine,13 which concerns itself with how the state structures its decision-
making process on “racial issues.”  To understand what the “political process” 
doctrine is and when it is triggered, it is helpful to examine the cases from which it 
arose.  Before I begin, I want to emphasize that this forthcoming discussion reflects 
my understanding of these cases at the time of the Prop. 209 case—pre-Schuette.  
      1 
The Supreme Court first applied the “political process doctrine” in a case 
called Hunter v. Erickson. There, the Court held that an amendment to the Charter 
of the City of Akron, Ohio, preventing the city council from enacting ordinances 
dealing with racial discrimination in housing, was unconstitutional.  The Court’s 
rationale was twofold.  First, the initiative dealt only with racial housing matters, 
thus having the effect of treating racial housing matters differently than other 
housing matters and other issues relating to race.14  Second, the initiative changed 
                                                          
13
 Or, alternatively, the “Hunter Doctrine”—after Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 
(1969), the first Supreme Court case it was articulated in.   
14
 “Here…there was an explicitly racial classification treating racial housing 
matters differently from other racial and housing matters.”  Hunter, 393 U.S. at 
389.   
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the decision-making process in such a way that it made it more difficult for those 
who ostensibly benefited from such a program to enact legislation.15 
2 
In a second case, called Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the 
Court applied the “political process” doctrine to desegregative public school 
busing.  In 1978, the Seattle School Board adopted a plan of mandatory school 
busing to improve the racial integration of its schools.  Opponents then passed a 
statewide initiative to stop such busing.  The school board then sued, alleging an 
equal protection violation.  The Court held that an initiative precluding such busing 
was unconstitutional.  It did so for two reasons.  First, desegregative busing 
“inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the minority, and [was] designed for that 
purpose.”16  Second, the initiative “use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the 
governmental decisionmaking structure,”17 thereby imposing “direct and 
undeniable burdens on minority interests.”18  
 
                                                          
15
 The initiative “disadvantages those who would benefit from laws barring racial, 
religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those who would bar other 
discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the real estate market in their 
favor….plac[ing] a special burden on racial minorities.”  Id. at 391. 
16
 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 (1982). 
17
 Id. at 470. 
18
 Id. at 484. 
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3 
As these cases demonstrate, prior to Schuette, the “political-process” 
doctrine stood for the principle that state action which structures political 
institutions or allocates governmental power “nonneutrally, by explicitly using the 
racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process,” violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.19 
III 
 And so we arrive at the Prop. 209 case, Coalition for Economic Equity v. 
Wilson.  The constitutionality of Proposition 209 turned on whether it could be 
distinguished from the initiatives in Seattle and Hunter.  My opinion for the Ninth 
Circuit held that Prop. 209 was, indeed, distinguishable on two grounds. 
     A 
First, in order to violate the “political process doctrine,” it must be shown 
that the state “reallocate[d] [decision-making] authority in a discriminatory 
manner.”20  In Crawford v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized an 
explicit distinction “between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and 
                                                          
19Id. at 470. 
20
 Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707. 
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state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters.”21  Whereas in 
Hunter and Seattle, the state had erected barriers to enacting policies to remedy 
racial discrimination in discrete areas like housing and busing, Prop. 209 
prohibited “all [State] instruments from discriminating against or granting 
preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of race.”22  Such measure, in other 
words, repealed all race-preference policies and restored racial neutrality in 
precisely the way Crawford said was permissible. 
B 
Second, as our cases have consistently held, “equal protection” is an 
individual guarantee.23  As I put it in our opinion, “[t]he ‘political structure’ cases 
do not create some paradoxical exception to this [element] of any equal protection 
violation.”24  In Hunter and Seattle, “the lawmaking procedure made it more 
difficult” for [certain individuals] to obtain protection against unequal treatment.”25  
In contrast, Prop. 209 made it more difficult for anyone to receive preferential 
                                                          
21
 Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 538 
(1982). 
22
 Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added). 
23
 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995). 
24
 Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707. 
25
 Id. at 707 (emphasis added). 
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treatment.  “Impediments to preferential treatment do not deny equal protection,” 
we said.26  
C 
Thus, as Prop. 209 reallocated decision-making authority in a neutral fashion 
and did not burden an individual’s right to equal treatment, our opinion for the 
court held that it did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.27  As I said at the 
time, we must not lose “sight of the forest for the trees” and remember that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “does not require what it barely permits.”28 
IV 
Now let’s return to Schuette, the Michigan case that was before the Court 
this term.  As I mentioned, Michigan voters, by passing Proposal 2 by a margin of 
                                                          
26
 Id. at 708. 
27
 An alternative argument dealt with the fact that the benefitted class, women and 
minorities, taken together constitutes a majority of the electorate. “When the 
electorate votes up or down on [Prop. 209], it is hard to conceive how members of 
the majority have been denied the vote.” Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 704.  
Moreover, even Hunter itself opines that “the majority needs no protection from 
discrimination,” 393 U.S. at 560, “in spite of our long line of cases that point to 
equal protection being an individual right.” Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 
704–05.  Additionally, it is important to note that the panel accepted, “without 
questioning, the district court’s finding that proposition 209 burdens members of 
insular minorities within the majority that enacted it who otherwise would seek to 
obtain race-based and gender based preferential treatment from local entities.”  Id. 
at 705.  
28
 Id. at 709  
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58 to 42 percent,29 amended their constitution to prohibit all government entities 
from discriminating on various grounds, including race.  A district court upheld the 
constitutionality of Proposal 2.  A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed in 
a 2-1 decision, but then the Sixth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, 
meaning that all fifteen eligible judges reheard the case.   
The Sixth Circuit’s en banc panel, by a vote of 8-7,30 reversed the district 
court, as had the three judge panel, holding that Michigan’s constitutional 
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause under the “political-process” 
doctrine.  First, it said, the amendment changed the decision-making authority.  
Second, it dealt only with racial preferences.  Lastly, it “lodged [the decision-
making authority] at the most remote level of Michigan’s government, the state 
constitution,” making it more difficult for supporters of these affirmative action 
programs to have their policy preference enacted.31  
The Sixth Circuit’s holding directly contradicted our opinion in the Prop. 
209 case, leading to a circuit split.  The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to 
                                                          
29
 Over three and a half million people voted, with the final margin being 2,141,010 
to 1,555,691.  State Proposal – 06-2: Constitutional Amendment: Ban Affirmative 
Action Programs, MICH. DEP’T OF ST., (May 10, 2007), 
http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/election/results/06GEN/90000002.html.  
30
 Judges Cole, Martin, Daughtrey, Moore, Clay, White, Stranch, and Donald voted 
in the majority.  Then-Chief Judge Batchelder and Judges Boggs, Gibbons, Rogers, 
Sutton, Cook, and Griffin all dissented.  
31
 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich. at 484. 
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resolve this disagreement among the circuits and to clarify equal protection 
jurisprudence.  
      V 
Well, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-2, reversed the Sixth Circuit, 
explicitly vindicating our opinion in the Prop. 209 case.32  Despite this widespread 
agreement on the result, however, the Court displayed anything but consensus in 
its reasoning: there were five opinions written in the case and not one was able to 
procure a majority.   
Justice Kennedy wrote the lead opinion—referred to as the plurality 
opinion—and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  Justice 
Sotomayor wrote the lone dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined.  Writing 
separately, Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer each authored opinions concurring 
only in judgment. Opinions concurring only in judgment usually indicate sharp 
disagreement among the Justices in their reasoning.  This case was no exception. 
For the sake of brevity, I will confine my discussion to the opinions that 
comprise the judgment of the court.  I will focus, in particular, on the plurality 
opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion because I believe understanding 
the agreements and disagreements between those two opinions will be most 
                                                          
32
 Justice Kagan recused herself. 
14 
 
edifying; however, I will be happy to answer any questions regarding the other 
opinions during the Q&A. 
     A 
“The battleground for [Schuette],” just as it had been for us in the Prop. 209 
case, “is the so-called political process doctrine.”33  The Court first had to 
determine if the political-process doctrine applied before analyzing its implications 
in Schuette.  
Justice Breyer, writing only for himself, concluded that the political process 
doctrine does not apply because the restructuring in Schuette was not, in fact, a 
political restructuring—it “took decisonmaking authority away from [an 
administrative body] and placed it in the hands of [a political body].”34  
In both the plurality opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, the 
application of the political-process cases is not so simple.  In entertaining the 
possibility of extending the political-process doctrine to Schuette, both opinions 
raise a number of constitutional issues.   
     1 
In their respective opinions, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy 
seriously question whether some of the language in Seattle, one of the political 
                                                          
33
 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
34
 Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).  
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process cases, is compatible with the Court’s traditional equal protection 
jurisprudence.  
The specific language that poses problems for Justices Scalia and Kennedy 
arises from when the Seattle Court, in applying the political process doctrine,  
determined that the initiative: (1) “inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the 
minority”;35 (2) focused on the “racial nature of an issue”;36 and (3) “burden[ed] 
minority interests.”37 
Both Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a plurality of the Court and Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion emphasize that these determinations by the Court, if 
required by Seattle, conflict with our settled equal protection jurisprudence.  
Expressing his agreement with Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia writes:  
No good can come of such random judicial musing…. For one 
thing, it involves judges in the dirty business of dividing the nation 
into racial blocks.  [Moreover,] the exercise promotes the noxious 
fiction that, knowing only a person’s color or ethnicity, we can be 
sure that he has a predetermined set of policy interests.38  
 
But the language of Seattle appears to urge, if not to require, the Court to do just 
that.  While the internal coherence of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is 
                                                          
35
 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472.  
36
 Id. at 470. 
37
 Id. at 484. 
38
 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1643 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
16 
 
important to both the plurality opinion and concurring opinion, it is not the only 
concern for these two Justices.         
2 
Extending the political process doctrine to voter-enacted amendments to 
state constitutions raises additional constitutional problems with regard to state 
sovereignty and our democratic process.   
Expressing concern for state sovereignty, Justice Scalia writes: “[The 
political process doctrine],[t]aken to the limits of its logic… is the gaping 
exception that nearly swallows the rule of structural state sovereignty.…The mere 
existence of a subordinate’s discretion over the matter would work as a kind of 
reverse pre-emption.”39   
In the plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy time and again reiterates his 
concern for the democratic process.  In a most telling passage, Justice Kennedy 
writes:   
Deliberative debate on sensitive issues such as racial preferences 
all too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify 
removing certain court-determined issues from the voters’ reach. 
Democracy does not presume that some subjects are either too 
divisive or too profound for public debate.40 
 
                                                          
39
 Id. at 1646 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
40
 Id. at 1637.  
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But Justice Kennedy does not restrict himself to the collective democratic process, 
for it is his belief in the individual voter that is the basis for his strong deference to 
the democratic process.  As he states in his opinion, “It is demeaning … to 
presume that … voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on 
decent and rational grounds.”41  Justice Kennedy, in declining to extend the 
political-process doctrine to Schuette, preserves the power of the people to decide 
this issue for themselves.  
 Therefore, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia agree that extending the 
language of Seattle to the question before the Court in Schuette could present 
serious constitutional problems: (1) it would contravene traditional equal 
protection jurisprudence; (2) it would threaten state sovereignty; and (3) it would 
restrict the democratic process.  
B 
With these serious constitutional concerns established, Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy are faced with the question of how to proceed with Hunter and Seattle.  
There are two traditional avenues to deal with an objectionable precedent.  The 
Court can either distinguish the current case from the precedent, or, of course, it 
                                                          
41
 Id. (emphasis added).  
18 
 
can overrule the precedent.  The choice between the aforementioned avenues is the 
fundamental disagreement between Justices Scalia and Kennedy.  
 In the plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy chooses to distinguish Seattle from 
Schuette.  First, Justice Kennedy addresses the problematic language in Seattle.  
[The] expansive language [in Seattle] does not provide a proper 
guide for decisions and should not be deemed authoritative or 
controlling…. Seattle is best understood as a case in which the 
state action … had the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing 
specific injuries on account of race.42  
 
With this understanding of Seattle, Justice Kennedy distinguishes the political-
process cases from the issue presented in Schuette:  
Here there was no infliction of a specific injury of the kind at issue 
in [the political-process cases].  Here there is no precedent for 
extending [such] cases to restrict the right of Michigan voters to 
determine that race-based preferences granted by Michigan 
governmental entities should be ended.43  
 
Having distinguished Schuette from the political process cases, Justice Kennedy 
concludes—“There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in 
this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit 
this policy determination to the voters.”44   
 By contrast, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, would have overruled 
the political-process cases.  Expressing vehemently his frustration with the 
                                                          
42
 Id. at 1634, 1633. 
43
 Id. at 1636. 
44
 Id. at 1638 (emphasis added). 
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plurality’s interpretation, which he views as a dereliction of the Court’s duty, 
Justice Scalia writes:  
Though [the plurality], too, disavows the political-process-doctrine 
basis on which Hunter and Seattle were decided . . . it does not 
take the next step of overruling those cases.  Rather, it reinterprets 
them beyond recognition.… I do not agree with [the plurality’s] 
reinterpretation of Seattle and Hunter, which makes them stand . . . 
for [a] cloudy and doctrinally anomalous proposition.45  
 
But as this conclusion is objectionable to Justice Scalia, for the reasons I have 
mentioned, among others, he would overrule the political process doctrine outright 
because it is, in his words: “Patently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary to our 
traditional equal-protection jurisprudence.”46  Indicating his alternative course of 
action, Justice Scalia continues: 
I would instead reaffirm that the ordinary principles of our law 
[and] of our democratic heritage require plaintiffs alleging equal 
protection violations stemming from facially neutral acts to prove 
intent and causation.47 
 
Under such framework, this case is easy.  Recalling my line from the Prop. 209 
case, Justice Scalia writes: “[A] law that prohibits the State from classifying 
individuals by race . . . a fortiori does not classify individuals by race.”48  
                                                          
45
 Id. at 1641-1642, 1640. 
46
 Id. at 1643 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
47
 Id. at 1640. 
48
 Id. at 1648 (quoting Coal. for Econ. Equity, 122 F. 3d at 702 (O’Scannlain, J.)). 
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Michigan’s constitutional amendment, therefore, is facially neutral and does not 
violate equal protection. 
C  
So where does Schuette leave us?  The judgment is clear: State constitutional 
amendments that bar racial (and presumably other fixed) preferences in college 
admissions do not violate equal protection.  But the principles and reasoning that 
dictate that result are far from clear.  The plurality declined to overrule the 
political-process cases, so they remain good law.  But is the political process 
doctrine still efficacious in practice, or, as Justice Sotomayor warns, has the 
plurality opinion’s interpretation of Hunter and Seattle effectively “cast aside the 
political-process doctrine sub silentio?”49 
As a jurist, I always regret such a fractured result from the Court.  For it is 
the rationale offered in the Court’s definitive opinion that will guide all federal 
judges, such as myself, when we decide future cases.  Indeed, as a judge on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, I may, in fact, be tasked one day with 
solving these very riddles.  Though you can rest assured that, as an appellate judge, 
I will do my duty to adhere to this precedent faithfully, I will withhold my personal 
reflections on these questions until such a day.  
                                                          
49
 Id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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*** 
In our exploration of Schuette, we truly see the pivotal role of language in 
our judicial process.  Although Schuette is by no means unique in this regard, it is 
exceptional in scope.  At the outset, we confronted the specific language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in order to understand what it permits, or rather, in this 
case, what it requires.  But our venture into the textual analysis did not stop there: 
we then explored how the Justices parsed the language of our prior opinions— 
Seattle and Hunter—separating reasoning central to the holdings from superfluous 
dicta.  Finally, in crafting an opinion for the Court, the Justices must balance a 
desire to procure a majority with the knowledge that it is the specific reasoning 
articulated in the Court’s opinion that will steer federal judges in future cases.  
Regardless of which method of legal interpretation you subscribe to—from 
Orginalism to Purposivism—textual interpretation is the central mechanism that 
motivates our jurisprudence.  
Thank you!  I will be happy now to answer any questions you may have. 
